Who would deny that our empirical evidence for or against the truth of There are rabbits is our empirical evidence for or against the existence of rabbits.
It is the very facts about meaning, not the entities meant, that must be construed in terms of behavior. But we cannot take the observations as providing this evidence unless we understand the terms marsupial mouse, kangaroo, and ordinary mouse in a particular way, and in a way that we do not have to understand them in order to take the observations as providing evidence for the truth of the similarity sentence.
So we cannot be speaking of nothing. But the im- pression is wrong that indeterminacy of translation, even in the extreme case of radical translation, can be illustrated only through the relations of different languages.
They are explicitly stated, frequently relied on, but never defended.
The only difference is in how you slice it. By taking in the whole community, Quine obtains an absolute standard for observation sentences p.
If the identity con- ditions of stimulations prove to be no easier to specify inter- subjectively than those of sense data, the advantage of linking language with reality via the truth of sentences rather than the reference of words remains none the less.
Evidence for the truth of this sentence is found in a vast array of observations that support a considerable part of bio- logical theory. Uncritical semantics is the myth of a museum in which the exhibits are meanings and the words are labels.
Remember the old argument that we never see the whole rabbit but only a part of its surface. Such would be the acceptable and reputable sort of similarity concept, if it could be defined. The rest of the book-the last of seven chapters to be precise-is devoted to objectivity and subjectivity in ethics.
Existence and its contrary[ edit ] The problem of non-referring names is an old puzzle in philosophy, which Quine captured when he wrote, A curious thing about the ontological problem is its simplicity.
But then whenever I am convinced that I am actually referring to a rabbit, I can reconsfrue my reference without assuming any change in my sensory experience, present or future as a reference to a rabbit stage belonging in a series of rabbit stages that comprises the history of a rabbit.
How can we claim that a and b are really similar and not so merely relative to our language when any statement of what objects a and b are must be relative to our language.
Their identity in relation to Rabbit is simply that they comprise what Quine calls the affirmative stimulus mean- ing of this sentence. Any two integers, for example, are really similar in an infinity of respects, since there is an infinity of arithmetical predicates true of both, and any permissible transformation of the ontology of arithmetic must preserve these similarities.
The advantage of stimula- tions over sense data is that they provide stimulus meanings for sentences rather than material from which objects of reference are to be inferred. Not only are we free to interpret a and b in various ways as referring to classes, enduring physical objects, object stages, undetached object parts, etc.
While a rabbit and a rabbit stage a stage in the history of a rabbit are quite different, I cannot deny that every rabbit has a life history.
What is a notable similarity for a scientist may not be so for a layman, But Quine flatly rejects such a relativity definition of similarity. holidaysanantonio.com: Ontological Relativity & Other Essays () by W. V. Quine and a great selection of similar New, Used and Collectible Books available now at great prices.
The thesis of Ontological Relativity – that ontology (what exists) is relative – is only intelligible if one first understands Quine’s arguments for the indeterminacy of translation, presented in great detail in his book, Word and Object, and rehearsed briefly in the early sections of “Ontological Relativity.”.
Willard Van Orman Quine (/ k w a"Epistemology Naturalized" in Ontological Relativity and Other Essays. New York: Columbia University Press: 69– "Truth by Convention," first published in. Ontological relativity and other essays.
New York: Columbia University Press, ix+ pp. $ I This collection of six essays affords the best general statement by Professor Quine of his philosophy yet to appear between the covers of a single book. METAPHILOSOPHY Vol. 2, No. 4, October REVIEWS W.
V. Q u m. Ontological relativity and other essays. New York: Columbia University Press, ix+ pp. $ "Ontological Relativity & Other Essays" is a collection that recapitulates the major philosophical themes that have come to be known as Quinean philosophy. From the two dogmas of empiricism, ontological relativity, radical translation, holism, and indeterminacy of translation, all of these issues are themes in this collection of holidaysanantonio.coms: 5.Ontological relativity and other essays by w v quine